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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Appellant has failed to state appropriate jurisdictional 
grounds for the jurisdiction of this appeal. Appellant sets 
forth Rule 3 and Rule 4 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure 
which are procedural provisions and do not state why this Court 
has jurisdiction. 
Further, Appellant sets forth Utah Code Annotated, §78-2a-
3(2)(e) which states that the Court of Appeals has jurisdiction 
of cases involving criminal appeals. This is not a criminal 
case. 
This Court has jurisdiction to decide this appeal pursuant 
to Utah Code Annotated, §78-2a-3(2)(h). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
As required by Rule 24(b)(1), Appellee has not included a 
statement of issues presented for review, determinative law or a 
statement of the case (a) Nature of the Case (b) Course of 
Proceedings/Disposition of the Trial Court. However, Appellee 
does wish to supplement the Appellant's statement of facts with 
the following facts. 
1 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
These facts are intended to supplement the facts as set 
forth in Appellant's brief. 
1. The parties were married on February 21, 1998 [R.82 at 
26]. 
2. Petitioner/Appellee (hereinafter "Stephanie") did not 
work from the time of marriage in 1998 until October, 2001. [R.82 
at 31]. 
3. Respondent/Appellant (hereinafter "Jason") became a 
manager of a Portland, Oregon, Walmart store in 2001. [R.82 at 
22]. 
4. Jason's base pay as a manager was $50,000.00 plus a 
percentage of the store's profits. In that year he made 
$65,000.00. [R.82 at 29]. 
5. The income of the family in 2001 was $65,677.00. In 
2002, it was $52,601.00. [R.83 at 36]. 
6. In Jason's Answer and Counterclaim he stated his income 
to be $40,680.00 per year, or $3390.37 per month. [R.82 at 36]. 
7. In Jason's financial declaration, he indicated his 
income was $2600.00 per month, or $31,200.00 per year. [R.82 at 
36]. 
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8« Jason's current income was determined from a check stub 
present at trial showing he received $1287.00 every two weeks, 
$30,888.00 per year. Jason had also stated that his income was 
$13.90 per hour, for $2390.00 per month or $28,689.00 per year. 
[R. 82 at 36]. 
9. Stephanie's income included $555.00 in welfare and 
$336o00 in food stamps. [R.82 at 43, 225]. 
10. Stephanie set forth two financial declaration, one of 
which was intended to show the change which would occur if child 
support and alimony were paid. [R.82 at 43-45; Exhibits 1 and 2]. 
11. Stephanie's family has subsidized her living expenses. 
[R.82 at 54]. 
12. When attempting work in the San Juan County area and 
putting the children in day care, Stephanie was earning $7.00 per 
hour and paying $6.00 per hour for day care. [R.82 at 62]. 
13o Stephanie is working towards a nursing degree. [R.82 at 
63]. 
14. When the parties moved from Oregon to Illinois, they 
anticipated that Jason would work as an assistant manager and 
believed that his income would remain the same as when he was a 
manager in Oregon. [R.82 at 87]. 
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15. The parties had substantial credit card debt. [R.82 at 
37-42; Exhibit 5]. 
16. Stephanie had no ability to pay the credit card 
obligations. [R.82 at 42, 54]. 
17. Stephanie had no ability to pay attorney's fees. [R.82 
at 50]. 
18. Jason chose not to work as a manager. [R.82 at 55]. 
19. Jason's decision to cut back on his hours did not come 
until one year after he was separated from Stephanie. [R.82 at 
145]. 
20. At the time Jason chose not to be an assistant manager 
in December, 2002, he was making $41,500.00 per year. [R82 at 
176]. 
21. During the marriage Jason had worked as a manager, a 
co-manager, an assistant manager, once again as a manager and 
then as an assistant manager. [R.82 at 148]. 
22. Jason's stated reason for not working as a manager is 
"I want to make sure my life is in order first". [R.82 at 147]. 
23. At the time of the trial Jason was living with a woman 
who had two children. [R.82 at 144]. 
24. At the time of the trial Jason was reporting that he 
had three children in his current home. [R.82 at 154]. 
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25. At the time of the trial Jason was supporting a 
girlfriend, her two children and a child born to Jason and the 
woman. [R.82 at 155]. 
26. Jason shares household expenses with his current 
girlfriend, their common child and her two other children. [R.82 
at 169]. 
27. Jason had not checked to see if he could move or work 
closer to his children in Utah. [R.82 at 175]. 
28. At the time Jason told Stephanie he wanted a divorce, 
they were living with Jason's parents. [R.82 at 74]. 
29. Jason suggested that Stephanie go to Utah. [R.82 at 
175]. 
30. Jason offered to move Stephanie. [R.82 at 176]. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
When reviewing the trial court's determination of alimony 
and attorney fees, an appellate courts reviews that decision for 
an abuse of discretion. Wiley v. Wiley, 951 P.2d 226, 230 (Utah 
1997) quoting Salmon v. Davis County, 916 P.2D 890, 892, 898 
(Utah 1996) (stating that determination of reasonable attorney 
fees is in the sound discretion of the trial court because of its 
familiarity with litigation, attorneys and attorney fees in 
general); Paffel v. Paffel, 732 P.2d 96, 100 (Utah 1986)(stating 
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that a trial court's awarding of alimony is not disturbed unless 
there is a clear and prejudicial abuse of discretion); Owen v. 
Owen, 579 P.2d 911, 913 (Utah 1978)(stating that considerable 
discretion is afforded the trial court "due to the advantaged 
position and responsibility of the trial court in such matters"). 
Generally speaking, questions of law are reviewed for 
correctness. The trial court's factual findings are reviewed 
only if clearly erroneous. State v. Finlayson, 994 P.2d 1243,116 
(Utah 2000). 
Factual determinations are entitled to deference on appeal 
and not reversible absent clear error. Lysenko v. Sawayaf 7 P.3d 
783 515. 
An Appellate Court "will not reverse the findings of Fact of 
a trial court sitting without a jury unless they are 'against the 
clear weight of the evidence', thus making them clearly 
erroneous. (Dept. of Human Services ex rel Parker v. Irizarry, 
945 P.2d 676, 678 (Utah 1997). In the Shepherd case the court 
stated: 
". . . The trial court has considerable latitude in 
adjusting financial and property interests, and its 
actions are entitled to a presumption of validity". 
Naranjo v. Naranjo, 751 P.2d 1144, 1146 (Ut.Ct.App. 
1988); Shepherd v. Shepherd, 876 P.2d 429, 430 (Ut.Ct. 
App.1994). 
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"This Court will not disturb the trial court's decision 
[concerning property division] unless it is clearly 
unjust or a clear abuse of discretion". Shepherd Id. 
at 433. 
And in the case of Elman v. Elman, 443 Utah Adv. Rpt.40,117, 
45 P.3d 176, 117, the court noted: 
"117'A trial court has considerable discretion 
concerning property [division] in a divorce proceeding 
thus its actions enjoy a presumption of validity.' 
Schaumberg v. Schaumberg, 875 P.2d 598, 602 (Ut. Ct. 
App. 1994). We disturb a trial court's property 
division and valuation 'only when there is 'a 
misunderstanding or misapplication of the law resulting 
in substantial and prejudicial error, the evidence 
clearly preponderates against the findings, or such a 
serious inequity has resulted as to manifest a clear 
abuse of discretion''. Id. (quoting Noble v. Noble, 
761 P.2d 1269, 1373 (Utah 1988))." 
ARGUMENT 
I 
APPELLANT (JASON) HAS FAILED TO MARSHALL THE EVIDENCE 
THEN ESTABLISH THAT THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS 
DISCRETION IN IMPUTING INCOME, AWARDING ALIMONY AND 
ATTORNEY'S FEES AND ORDERING JASON TO PAY THE COSTS 
INVOLVED IN EXERCISING PARENT TIME. 
A party who seeks to overturn the factual decisions of a 
court has the responsibility of marshaling the evidence. The 
court stated in Utah Med. Prods, v. Searcy, 958 P.2d 228,232 
(Utah 1998) : 
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"After marshaling all of the evidence in support of the 
trial court's ruling, the appellant must demonstrate 
that even in the light most favorable to the trial 
court, the evidence is insufficient to support the 
findings. Reed v. Mutual of Omaha Insurance Company, 
176 P.2d 896, 899 (Utah 1980). We apply this 
deferential standard to trial courts because of their 
advantaged position to evaluate the evidence and 
determine the facts. Willey v. Willey, 951 P.2d 226, 
230 (Utah 1997); see also Utah Rules of Civil 
Proceduref Rule 52a. If the challenger fails to meet 
this burden its claim must fail." 
In setting forth the standard of review in the case of State 
v. Robertson, 932 P.2d 1219, 1223 (Utah 1997), the court stated: 
"Before this court Robertson essentially challenges the 
trial court's finding of fact. Therefore Robertson 
bears the burden of marshaling all of the evidence in 
favor of the factual findings that he was malingering 
then demonstrate that even viewing the evidence in the 
light most favorable to the court below, the evidence 
is insufficient to support the court's finding." 
Additionally, in the case of Whitear v. Labor Commission, 
973 P.2d 982, 985 (Ut.Ct. App. 1998), the court stated: 
"When a party fails to marshal the evidence, we assume 
the record supports the commission's findings. See 
Intermountain Health Care v. Industrial Commfnf 839 
P.2d 841, 844 (Ut.Ct.App. 1992). We have shown no 
reluctance to affirm when the petitioner has failed to 
meet its marshaling burden. See e.g. Turnbaugh v. 
Anderson, 793 P.2d 939, 944 (Ut.Ct.App. 1990). 
Jason supports his position by reference to the record on 
those issues most favorable to him, but has failed to set forth 
all of the facts and especially those most favorable to the 
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court's findings below and then show why the court could not find 
as it did* Failing to marshal the evidence and demonstrate to 
this court why the findings are insufficient when viewed most 
favorable to the court's findings, his claims must fail. 
II 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION WHEN IT 
IMPOSED THE STATUTORY GUIDELINES FOR PARENT TIME AND 
REQUIRED JASON TO PAY THE COSTS OF GETTING THE CHILDREN TO 
AND FROM PARENT TIME VISITS. 
In the case of Hudemy v. Carpenter, 989 P.2d 491, the court 
was faced with a determination of what was in a child's best 
interest where it was requested to change custody. While a 
change of custody was not requested in our casef the best 
interests of the children was an issue. 
At Utah Code Annotated §30-3-34, the court is charged with 
the responsibility of "establishing a parent time schedule 
consistent with the best interests of the child". In Hudemy at 
f26 in addressing the best interest issue, the court said: 
"Generally it is within the trial court's discretion to 
determine based on the facts before it and within the 
confines set by the appellate courts, where a 
particular factor falls within the spectrum of relative 
importance and to import each factor its appropriate 
weight." See Davis v. Davis, 749 P.2d 647, 648 (Utah 
1988); Childs v. Childs, 967 P.2d 942, 945 (Ut.Ct.App. 
1998, Cert. Denied) 982 P.2d 88 (Utah 1999 Lexis 
64(1999)(the importance of the myriad of factors used 
in determining the child's best interest ranges from 
the possibly relevant to the critically important). 
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The court took into consideration the extensive distance 
between the parties where it indicated they were separated by 
1200-1300 miles. [R.82 at 218]. The court further reasoned that 
it was going to be nearly impossible for Jason to see the 
children for any length of time except on long vacations. [R.82 
at 217]. The court then made a concession with regard to the 
four year old by setting the minimum visitation schedule for five 
through 18 year olds, taking into consideration that the two 
children would likely be more comfortable going together. [R.82 
at 218]. 
The court further found that there had not been any 
testimony or evidence that an alternative custody arrangement 
would be beneficial to the children or was in fact set forth or 
requested. [R.82 at 217]. The court had information that when 
Jason told Stephanie he did not want to be married to her anymore 
that he suggested she go to Utah [R.82 at 175] and that he 
offered to move her [R.82 at 176]. The court noted that Jason 
chose to stay in the Chicago area because his girlfriend had 
close ties there. [R.82 at 175]. 
The court had information that Jason did not seek marital 
help when the marriage was having difficulty. [R.82 at 154]. 
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Jason had not checked to see if he could work closer to his Utah 
children [R.82 at 175]. 
The court considered Stephanie's ability to help pay for the 
cost of parent time and found her income of approximately $900 
per month [R.82 at 43] where the court found she did not have an 
ability to pay the credit cards and other debts. [R.82 at 37, 
42], did not have an ability to pay attorney' fees [R.82 at 50] 
and drove a car with over 150,000 miles [R.82 at 89] in which she 
did not feel comfortable driving halfway because of the car's 
lack of dependability. [R.82 at 84]. 
In making a determination regarding parent time expense, the 
distance that the parties must travel is only one factor. The 
court took into consideration the relative ability of each of the 
parties to pay the costs. Utah Code Annotated £30-3-34, 
indicates that the court may make adjustments. The statute also 
sets forth the provision that the parent time schedule in Utah 
Code Annotated §30-3-35, which the court applied in this case, is 
". . . presumed to be in the best interest of the child 
. . . unless a parent can establish otherwise by a 
preponderance of the evidence that more or less parent 
time should be awarded. . . " 
Jason has simply quoted the statute and indicated that 
because one of the criteria is the distance between the parties 
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that some adjustment should be made over the presumed reasonable 
schedule. Jason has not, by a preponderance of the evidence, 
shown that the court should have done something different in this 
circumstance and the court had many facts to consider with regard 
to the best interest of the children. The court did not abuse 
its discretion in setting parent time in accordance with the 
statutory schedule and had substantial evidence to find and rule 
as it did. 
With regard to the court's determination that Jason should 
be responsible for his parent time costs, it is clear that the 
court took into consideration the relative financial 
circumstances of each of the parties. 
The Court also took into consideration that Jason had 
initiated the breakup of the marriage and had suggested that 
Stephanie move to Utah and had offered to bear the expense of her 
move. Jason is responsible for the distance between himself and 
his children and the court so found. 
Jason hasn't established Stephanie's ability to assist in 
those parent time costs. Taking into consideration the 
distances, the financial condition of the parties, the 
responsibility for the distance between the parties and the other 
factors enumerated herein, Jason has not established by a 
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preponderance of the evidence that there was any abuse of 
discretion on the part of the court in ordering statutory 
visitation or in establishing that the costs thereof should be 
borne by Jason. 
Ill 
THE COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION WHEN IT IMPUTED 
JASON'S INCOME. 
On this argument, Jason agrees that imputation of income is 
appropriate in some circumstances and simply recounts all of the 
circumstances that would show that he was not voluntarily 
unemployed or underemployed. The thrust of his argument is that 
he was diligent because he did not quit workf but took a lower 
paying job. Jason argues that because of stress he does not have 
the ability to generate the higher income, that his taking a 
lesser paying job was reasonable, and thus income could not be 
imputed. 
Jason quotes the case of Hill v. Hill, 869 P.2d 963 (Ut. Ct. 
App. 1994), where a party quit a higher paying job in order to go 
back to the university to get a degree and it was determined that 
imputation of income at the higher level was appropriate. Jason 
states that his situation is different from that case because he 
did not decide to quit to go back to school nor did he, as in 
Hill, concede that imputation of income was appropriate. A case 
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that argues towards imputation of income does not seem to support 
Jason's position; the act of quitting his higher paid job was 
voluntary. 
Under Utah Code Annotated §78-45-7.5(7) income may be 
imputed where it is found that a parent is voluntarily unemployed 
or underemployed. The court is to take into consideration 
employment potential and probable earnings as derived from work 
history, occupation qualifications and earnings for persons in 
similar backgrounds in the community. Let's explore, for a 
moment the facts the court had which relate to this issue. The 
court had some detail with regard to historical earnings of the 
parties when they were married and moved to Oregon. The court 
had the base pay of a Walmart manager at $50,000.00, plus a 
percentage of the profits [R.82 at 29]; in 2001 the parties made 
$65,677.00 [R.82 at 36]; in 2002 the parties made $62,601.00 
[R.82 at 36]; Jason's Answer and Counterclaim and his own 
documentation represented his income to be $40,600.00 per year; 
and his financial declaration stated his income to be $31,200.00 
per year. 
The court had several different income amounts for Jason, 
established by different methods [R.82 at 36]. This information, 
together with information as to the income of a manager in the 
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Walmart system [R.82 at 93], gave the court sufficient 
information to impute income. Both of the parties believed 
Jason would retain his manager's salary, or at least that of an 
assistant manager, once they moved to Illinois [R.82 at 87, 95]. 
The main reason Jason was no longer working as a manager was that 
he chose not to do so because of the "stress". [R.82 at 55]. Had 
Jason continued to work as a manager and had not cut back on his 
hours approximately one year after the parties separated, his 
income would have remained at $50,000.00, plus a percentage of 
profits. Jason stated that the only thing that stopped him from 
working as a manager was that "he wanted to make sure that his 
life was in order first". [R.82 at 47]. Jason's testimony was 
that he chose not to be an assistant manager in 2002 and decided 
to take a pay cut from $41,500.00 down to unload trucks for 
around $30,000.00. [R.82 at 176]. 
The court found that Jason had established that he did have 
difficulties in trying to be a manager and may not be able to 
return to that position, but there had not been a showing that he 
had the same difficulty as an assistant manager. The evidence 
was uncontroverted that he could earn approximately $41,500.00 as 
an assistant manager and could be successful in that position and 
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his income should be imputed at said amount. Not being employed 
as an assistant manager was a voluntary decision on Jason's part. 
In the case of Mancil v. Smith, 18 P.3d 509 (Ut. Ct. App. 
2000), the court was looking at the imputation of income and the 
issue was that sufficient findings had not been made regarding 
the occupation qualifications, pjrevailing earnings for persons of 
similar background in the community, etc., as set forth in U.C.A. 
§78-45-7.5. In Mancil, the argument was that the court had erred 
in imputing income to the other party based solely on the past 
work history. The Utah Supreme Court held that these findings 
were "necessarily implied" by the nature of the work she had 
regularly performed in the past. Mancil at 120. The court went 
on to state: 
"The court looked at Smith's prior work history and 
noticed his wages at his past place of employment . . . 
the court also looked at his employment history and 
income prior to his employment at Enrich. The court 
then imputed income . . . consistent with his long term 
employment history. Explicit findings concerning 
'occupational qualifications and prevailing earnings of 
persons of similar backgrounds in the community' were 
not necessary as Smith's qualifications and background 
and actual past earnings were not in dispute. See Id. 
at pp.15-16. Therefore there was an adequate factual 
basis supporting the trial court's decision to impute 
income to Smith . . . " 
The recitation of facts from the transcript involving stress 
and Jason's assertion that he was not a malingerer does not 
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answer the question of whether income may be imputed. Jason 
stated he voluntarily gave up the job as assistant manager to 
work as a "stocker". When these facts are taken in the best 
light of Stephanie's case, the court had sufficient facts on 
which to determine that imputation of income was proper. With no 
additional showing by Jason that there was something improper 
about the imputation, there is no abuse of discretion. 
IV 
THE TRIAL COURT HAD SUFFICIENT FACTS UPON WHICH TO AWARD 
ALIMONY. 
Three factors have long been considered, and must always be 
considered, before awarding alimony. First, the financial 
condition of the recipient spouse; second, the ability of the 
recipient spouse to provide a sufficient income for herself; and 
third, the ability of the payor spouse to provide support. See 
Davis v. Davis, 749 P.2d 647, 649 (Utah 1988), citing Jones v. 
Jones, 700 P.2d 1072, 1075 (Utah 1985). The court clearly 
recognized the responsibility to balance Stephanie's need against 
Jason's ability to pay. [R.82 at 227]. In this regard, the court 
reviewed two financial declarations, showing Stephanie's monthly 
income and expenses with and without welfare and food stamps. 
[R.82 at 43-45, 54]. The trial court had the information that 
Stephanie was receiving $555 per month in welfare and $336 in 
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food stamps, her entire income was provided by public assistance. 
[R82 at 43]. From her financial declarations, the court had the 
information that Stephanie was going in the hole each month and 
was being subsidized by her family. [R.82 at 54]. 
The court noted that Stephanie did not have the ability to 
pay her attorney's fees and that she had no ability to pay credit 
card debt. [R.82 at 37-42]. Much has been made by Jason that 
Stephanie had the ability to go back to work for Walmart in the 
Monticello area (the closest being 60 miles away) and that going 
to school to become a nurse was foolhardy. If Stephanie were to 
return to Walmart she would do so at entry level wages and she 
was paying $6.00 per hour for daycare, netting approximately 
$1.00 per hour for her efforts. Stephanie further stated that 
when she came to the San Juan County area she was able to survive 
by living with her parents and by accepting help from her family. 
The best way for Stephanie to become gainfully employed and be 
able to support herself and the three children, would be to 
complete her nursing studies. 
With the two financial statements, [R. 46, R.82 at 43-45; 
Exhibits 1 and 2], the court clearly had sufficient evidence 
within the record to establish Stephanie's financial need. The 
testimony with regard to her income and ability to work at 
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Walmart (a distance of 60 miles one way) and the expense of day 
care, gave the court substantial information upon which to make 
the determination that Stephanie was unable to support herself 
and the three children. 
The imputation of Jason's income was previously discussed in 
issue III and such information established Jason's ability to pay 
alimony. 
An alimony award should, insofar as possible, equalize the 
parties' respective standards of living and maintain them at a 
level as close as possible to the standard of living enjoyed in 
the marriage. Given the small amount of income Stephanie is 
realistically able to earn on her own, she will not be able to 
enjoy a standard of living anywhere near the level she enjoyed 
when the parties earned $65,000. Her expenses exceeding her 
income, she has been forced to rely upon public assistance and 
help from her family, while Jason maintained, or bettered, his 
standard of living with a new family. 
The alimony award in the present case falls short of placing 
Stephanie in a standard of living enjoyed during marriage, a most 
important function of alimony. The court stated in Higley v. 
Higley, 76 P.2d 379 (Utah 1983): 
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"This court will not disturb the trial court's 
distribution of property and award of alimony in a 
divorce proceeding unless a clear and prejudicial abuse 
of discretion is shown." 
The court concluded that Stephanie had only $669.00 to meet 
her needs and that Jason had $2550.00 to meet his needs [R.82 at 
225], that neither of the parties was going to be able to enjoy 
the lifestyle that they had while Jason was working as a manager 
at Walmart in Oregon. Therefore, the court endeavored to "spread 
the misery" [R.82 at 226], and the court awarded alimony for only 
three years. 
None of the facts quoted in this portion of Appellee's brief 
are controverted by Jason. His brief merely wishes the Court of 
Appeals to come to a different conclusion than the trial court. 
Such desire is not enough to invoke a reversal. Jason has not 
controverted the facts or established that the trial court made 
an erroneous ruling, other than Jason's feeling that the court 
should have made a different ruling, more in his favor. 
V 
THE COURT IS WITHIN ITS DISCRETION TO AWARD ATTORNEYS FEES. 
The basis for awarding of attorney's fees is very similar to 
the awarding of alimony. There are three factors for the trial 
court to consider in awarding attorney's fees. First, the 
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receiving spouse's financial need; second, the payor spouse's 
ability to pay; and third, the reasonableness of the requested 
fees. Childs v. Childs, 967 P.2d 942, 947 (Ut. Ct. App. 1998): 
"The decision to award attorney's fees and the amount 
thereof rests primarily in the sound discretion of the 
trial court." Id. at 947. 
Stephanie has previously argued the issues of her need and 
Jason's ability to pay. The only other issue is the 
reasonableness of the attorney fees. Stephanie's attorney 
established that $125 per hour is a reasonable rate for attorneys 
in the San Juan County area and the total amount of fees up to 
the trial was $2000. An additional $500 would be charged for a 
QDRO and based upon such testimony, Jason's attorney elected to 
prepare the final documents and the QDRO. No opposing testimony 
was presented by Ms. Reilly with regard to the reasonableness of 
fees or the amount charged. Aside from case law which 
establishes that reasonable attorney fees may be awarded, Utah 
Code Annotated, §30-3-3 provides: 
"In any action to establish an order of custody, parent 
time, child support, alimony or division of property, 
the court may order a party to pay the costs, attorneys 
fees and witness fees of the other party to enable the 
other party to prosecute or defend the action." 
Additionally, at subpart (2): 
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"In any action to enforce an order of custody, parent 
time, child support, cilimony or the division of 
property in a domestic case, the court may award costs 
and attorney fees upon determining that the party 
substantially prevailed upon the claim or defense." 
The uncontroverted evidence in this case establishes that 
Stephanie's attorneys fees and costs were reasonable and further, 
that she did prevail on the issues, and thereby the court was 
within its discretion to award attorneys fees and costs and took 
into consideration the relative position of both parties and 
reasonableness of those fees in awarding $2000. 
CONCLUSION 
The Appellant has chosen to attack the trial court's ruling 
based in each case, on abuse of discretion. In so doing, Jason 
must marshal the evidence and show, in light of all of the 
evidence which supports the findings of the court, that there was 
no way the court could reach the decisions it reached. The 
Appellant has failed in each area contested. Jason has failed to 
marshal the evidence, has failed to establish the factors the 
court could have considered to support its decision. 
With regard to the attorneys fees, it is within the sound 
discretion of the trial court to make such determination because 
of the trial court's familiarity with the litigation, attorneys 
and attorneys fees in general in the area where that court sits, 
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without some showing of clear and prejudicial abuse of 
discretion, this court should not disturb the trial court's 
rulings; the same can be said for the awarding of alimony. The 
court's award of alimony is not disturbed unless there is clear 
and prejudicial abuse of discretion. 
Jason has failed to meet his burden on each claim. The 
court did not abuse its discretion in its determination of these 
issues and the ruling of the trial court should not be 
overturned. 
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